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Do Online Illicit Drug Market Exchanges Afford Rationality? 
Abstract 
Rational choice perspectives have been the dominant models used for conceptualising the 
nature of exchanges in illicit drug markets, but various critiques have found these abstracted 
assumptions inadequate for understanding concrete illicit drug market activity. Considerably 
less, however, is known about key aspects of rationality in exchanges within online drug 
markets. Recognising the inadequacies of an underlying homo economicus, we instead 
conceive drug market exchanges as complex assemblages, noting how exchanges are 
reconstructed in online spaces, and technological affordances may facilitate elements of 
rationality in drug exchanges. Adopting these notions allows us to argue that aspects of 
rationality can potentially contribute to an understanding of exchange practices in online 
markets, and that online channels can afford assumptions of utility-maximisation, rich market 
information to guide decision-making, and anonymity in the exchange. In addition, 
consideration is given to the structural variability of online illicit drug markets, and that the 
affordance of rationality should be considered across a spectrum of applicability that takes 
into account the specifics of each dimension of online drug market (i.e. drug cryptomarkets, 
illicit online pharmacies, and “app-based” drug markets).  
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Introduction 
Dominant explanations of the drug-exchange process in offline1 illicit drug markets rely on 
perspectives of rationality and utility-maximisation (Caulkins & Reuter, 2006; Dwyer & 
Moore, 2010a, 2010b; Eck, 1995; Jacques, Allen, & Wright, 2014; Jacques & Wright, 2011; 
Weatherburn, Topp, Midford, & Allsop, 2000). These models presuppose offline illicit drug 
market participants as hedonistically operating actors, who pursue maximum pleasure and 
minimum pain from any given drug exchange. While rational choice perspectives have been 
the prevailing frameworks used for understanding exchange within offline drug markets, this 
perspective has nonetheless been widely contested. Critical analyses have found these 
abstracted perspectives wanting in regard to various facets of concrete illicit drug market 
activity, and for oversimplifying the nature of the exchanges that actually occur in drug 
markets (Dwyer & Moore, 2010a, 2010b; Moeller, 2018; Sandberg, 2012). While offline 
drug supply relies on physically and temporally situated practices, the widespread adoption of 
the Internet has given rise to new methods and opportunities for supplying and accessing 
illicit drugs. These new forms of illicit drug supply provide an opportunity to re-assess 
theoretical assumptions related to the nature of exchange.   
 Online2 illicit drug markets are located in various forms across the surface net (the 
regular internet that is directly accessible to casual browsing) and the dark net (requiring the 
use of specialised access and anonymising browsers), and through social media and 
encrypted messaging applications installed on smartphones. Existing research on these 
emerging drug markets has provided helpful descriptive overviews of market actors, and the 
types of drugs sold through these platforms, but there is scant attention to theoretical 
explorations of these new spaces of drug exchange, and importantly, how online illicit drug 
markets are differentiated (Coomber, 2015) from offline illicit drug markets (see Aldridge & 
Askew, 2017; Bakken, Moeller, & Sandberg, 2018 for exceptions). Additionally, current 
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theoretical assessments of the nature of exchange in online drug markets often has too narrow 
a focus by only accounting for one form of market and not considering how theoretical 
explanations vary across online platforms that may differ in meaningful ways. This article 
addresses this lacuna in such research.  
The nature of exchange in online illicit drug markets differs from those in offline 
markets as online forms of drug exchange, unlike many offline markets, have digitised 
structures and arrangements designed to produce a context where both buyers and sellers 
perceive their exchanges to be safer, of better quality, more reliable, and more temporally 
manageable. The conditions for rational choice decision-making in online illicit drug markets 
appears therefore, intuitively, to be much enhanced by the structural affordances of these 
technologies. As a result, exchanges can include some elements of the archetypal, ideal 
exchanges as proposed in rational choice models compared to those found in offline instances 
of drug exchange. To this end, the aim of this article is twofold: to disentangle the critiques of 
rational-choice perspectives of exchange as they relate to offline illicit drug markets; and, 
through the use of assemblage-thinking and the notion of technological affordance (Latour, 
2002), explore how online spaces for buying and selling drugs may afford greater levels of 
rationalised exchange, while taking into account the nuanced features of different online 
markets. We are by no means specifically ‘testing’ rational choice theory, but rather, 
providing a theoretical discussion that draws on the comparisons between different drug 
exchange assemblages (offline/online) and the affordance capabilities of online technologies 
for the drug exchange.  
The article is presented in three parts. First, it begins with an overview of rational 
choice perspectives, and outlines how rational actors are expected to operate in these 
instances of market exchange. Rational choice perspectives have been significantly refined 
over time due to the over-reliance on inadequate models where actors “naturally” operate as 
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per neoclassical assumptions. This is followed by a critical assessment of rational choice 
perspectives as applied to exchange in offline drug markets, as well as how such applications 
have tried to accommodate various limitations. We consider why it is the case that, despite 
the conceptualisation of such exchanges through models of rationality, it is generally 
accepted that actors in illicit drug markets do not attempt to “maximise utility” at any cost as 
per the central tenet of rational choice theory. Moreover, individuals performing exchanges in 
offline markets often do not, to any great extent, consider the costs and benefits of exchanges. 
This may be in part due to the lack of available information that guides exchange 
arrangements between actors, the nature of drug-related harm and wider structural 
disadvantages, in conjunction with the fact that exchange parties in illicit drug markets are 
indeed not the anonymous agents as proposed in rational choice models. Often, these are not 
isolated exchanges, and social expectations guide exchanges to a greater degree than utility-
maximisation. Rational choice understandings of exchange are formally abstract models 
whereas, for various reasons, real-life drug focussed exchanges do not always simply reflect 
such abstracted modelling. The third section of the article proposes that, by comparison and 
in relative terms, online illicit drug markets create affordances, where drug market actors 
participating in these specific models of drug supply can be guided throughout their decision-
making processes, can draw on available information, make an active consideration of the 
costs and benefits involved in the exchange, and are afforded the ability to maximise their 
expected utility from these drug market exchanges.   
The comparisons made in this article are important as they highlight how the evolving 
digitalisation of spaces for supplying and accessing drugs creates the condition for the 
changing nature of drug focussed exchanges and how we understand them through a 
reconstruction of the drug exchange assemblage. Rather than advocating that rational choice 
models become the primary mode of analysis for online drug markets and participants, 
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recognising inherent flaws in assuming that all action is purely rational, we draw on key 
aspects of rationality to highlight the affordance capabilities of technologies, and to detail 
how certain aspects of theoretical models differ depending on the particular market under 
investigation. Further, by drawing attention to the structural variability of these digital spaces, 
the article illustrates how rational choice models may theoretically “fit” to differing degrees 
depending on which specific illicit drug market is being referred to. In doing so, this article 
contributes to the burgeoning literature recognising illicit drug markets as differentiated in 
meaningful ways (see Coomber, 2010, 2015) and assists future researchers in conceptualising 
drug market behaviour for the criminology of illicit drug markets (Moeller, 2018).  
 
The Origins of Rational Choice and Rational Exchanges 
Perspectives on human rationality across many disciplines (e.g. economics, behavioural 
psychology, criminology, political sciences) derive from methodological individualism and 
the notion that all actions are the result of easily interpretable statements whereby individuals 
will try to maximise their own interests (Etzioni, 2011; Scott, 2000). The origins of this 
perspective on human behaviour is found in Hobbes’ (17th century) assertions that humans 
naturally compete and fight for their own interests, and Bentham’s (18th and 19th century) 
claims in relation to the guiding forces of attaining pleasure and avoiding pain (Bentham, 
1996; Epstein, 2013; Long, 1990). These claims have remained central to the idea of 
rationality but have since been refined and expressed in terms of the concept of utility, which 
is often operationalised as the propensity for actions to promote advantage, benefit, or 
pleasure to the individual enacting the behaviour (Kahneman, Wakker, & Sarin, 1997). Thus, 
when faced with different courses of action, a “rational” individual is one who will assess the 
likely outcomes of each action, and select the appropriate option that promotes the most 
benefit (Heath & Heath, 1976; Hollis & Sugden, 1993; Scott, 2000). 
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This perspective, which views human behaviour as fundamentally rational by way of 
operating through purely self-interested means, has traditionally been the primary method of 
understanding exchanges made in the context of markets where goods are exchanged. 
Smith’s (1776) propositions in The Wealth of Nations provided an early account of the idea 
that individuals participating in market exchanges are inherently rational actors promoting 
their own interests of utility-maximisation (Ashraf, Camerer, & Loewenstein, 2005). These 
exchanges are presumed to occur in markets demonstrating “ideal” conditions through the 
mechanisms of supply and demand, the presence of perfect information related to products 
being exchanged, that individuals within these markets are entirely anonymous in the sense 
that nothing more is expected from the exchange but the contents of the exchange itself, and 
that prior relationships are not a prerequisite for participating in exchange (Alexander & 
Alexander, 1991; Danby, 2002; Plattner, 1983; Zafirovski, 2000).   
 
Moving Beyond Utility-Maximisation in Exchanges 
Claims that market exchanges are driven purely through self-interest and egoistic rationality 
may be limited in markets that do not perfectly adhere to ideal conditions and in non-western 
contexts of exchange (De L’Estoile, 2014; Emerson, 1976; Manzo, 2013; Simon, 1955). 
Early ideas for the rejection of a purely rational actor for exchanges were proposed by the 
classical anthropologist Bronislaw Malinowski (1922), whose research on exchange has been 
described as an “explicit attack on the notion of a universal ‘economic man’” (Hann, 2018, 
p1). Malinowski’s research highlighted forms of exchange that still predominantly comprised 
the exchange of goods between individuals, but was, as Danby (2002, p. 16) claims, “too 
elaborate and socially complex to be understood by conventional economic theory”. These 
exchanges were not characterised by the presence of material profit among actors involved in 
the exchange. Rather, the purpose of many of these exchanges centred on the non-economic 
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components of community, status, and relationships rather than utility-maximisation for self-
interest (Malinowski, 1922). The nature of exchanges explored in early anthropological 
research (see also Mauss, 1966) indicated that exchanges for goods may not always be the 
result of cognisant cost-benefit considerations among anonymous actors, but instead, 
exchanges may be the product of traditions and relationship-building among individuals 
(Smelser, 1992).  
Another criticism of rational choice perspectives is their lack of apparent applicability 
in markets where economic exchanges are the primary purpose of the exchange. Because of 
this, many have argued for a shift away from the dichotomisation of exchange perspectives as 
either purely social or economic, and maintain that a blend of both exchange frameworks will 
be fruitful, whereby rational market-based exchanges can be embedded within social 
relationships and cultural expectations (Granovetter, 1985; Spiliman, 2006; Zelizer, 1988). 
Alternatively, social exchanges themselves can be understood through a process of 
considering the costs and benefits of the social exchange (Emerson, 1976; Stafford, 2008), 
and social networks may modify an actors’ utilitarian preferences by contributing to the 
search for the highest quality goods (DiMaggio & Louch, 1998). The embeddedness of social 
relations within market exchanges is particularly evident when there are risks involved in the 
market-exchange, such as when there is less information to guide cost-benefit decision-
making (or an asymetrical distribution of information between exchange participants), and in 
particular market structures (Akerlof, 1970; Alexander & Alexander, 1991; Geertz, 1978; 
Plattner, 1983).  
The above discussion highlights some of the various ways that notions of a purely 
“economic man”, or homo economicus, have consistently been refuted and shown to be 
abstracted from the social dimensions of market exchanges. Experimental studies have 
consistently debunked the “natural” tendency for actors to operate according to principles 
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outlined in neoclassical economics (Henrich et al., 2001; Karacuka & Zaman, 2012). On a 
more macro-level, events such as the 2008 global financial crisis expose the failings of a 
historical hegemony of neoliberal models pertaining to self-interest and efficient, competitive 
markets. Understanding human behaviour through homo economicus alone is clearly 
inadequate as it relies on a limited empirical base. Thus, there is move beyond the unlimited 
and all-encompassing forms of rationality proposed in neoclassical paradigms, and any 
constructions of an “economic man” have to be philosophically, sociologically, 
psychologically and empirically grounded (Henrich et al., 2001; Ng & Tseng, 2008; 
Yamagishi, Li, Takagishi, Matsumoto, & Kiyonari, 2014; Zafirovski, 2014).   
 Debating the value of rational choice theory has become, as Lovett (2006, p.237) 
claims, “something of a cause-celebre” for theorists. As a result. rational choice perspectives 
have been refined over time, leading to current stances that individuals operate under 
bounded rationality (Simon, 1972) and will satisfice/optimise their preferences (Thaler, 
2016). For scholarship on rational choice to progress, it may therefore be important to 
understand the role of rational choice in specific explanations of behaviour, and the instances 
where such a theory can more richly and accurately describe some phenomena over others 
(Hudik, 2019; Lovett, 2006). Assigning degrees of rationality to agents in the specific 
contexts in which they are being studied demonstrates awareness of the fact that human 
behaviours are socially and environmentally contextualised (Coyle, 2019), and that markets 
and certain situations may have unique configurations that structure the choices and decisions 
of actors (Biggart & Beamish, 2003; Ostrom, 2010; Plattner, 1983; Plott, 1986; Thaler, 
2000). This is opposite to situating individuals within a perspective of natural tendencies to 
promote advantage through self-interested, maximising means.  
 
Drug Market Exchanges as Assemblages 
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In taking this focus on structural differentiation, and how contexts differ with respect to 
aspects of rationality, we position drug market exchanges within the notion of “assemblages”. 
Assemblage-thinking focuses on the emergent coming together of heterogenous – and 
initially disparate – elements, materials, forces, spaces, bodies, procedures and interactions 
between all of these components to form assemblages (DeLanda, 2006; Deleuze & Guattari, 
1987; McFarlane, 2011; Taylor, 2009). Assemblage-thinking is being increasingly 
incorporated into the analysis of contemporary alcohol and other drug use and related 
problems. Duff (2016), for example, suggests how assemblages emphasise the way that drug 
problems emerge through a cast of human and non-human actors, as well as distal and 
proximal forces. We use this notion to think about drug market exchanges as the formation of 
heterogenous components, and as situated within a complex assemblage of elements. Drug 
market exchanges are produced and play out in specific environments, which will have 
different outcomes for how theoretical models are applied to these different drug exchange 
assemblages.  
 
A Critique of Rational Choice Perspectives on Offline Illicit Drug Market Activity 
Many different perspectives have been put forward to understand illicit drug market activity, 
but none have been more dominant than insights formed through the lens of economics and 
rationality (Ritter, 2006). Indeed, the conceptualisation of drug markets in this manner has 
been so popular that Bushway and Reuter (2008, p. 434) claim that, “it is hard to imagine the 
study of drug markets, and illegal markets generally, without the inclusion of economists and 
economic insight”. As will be explored further, research adopting rational choice models 
posits that illicit drug markets operate in a similar manner to markets for legal products (i.e. 
as characterised by adherence to conditions of supply/demand, and the presence of 
competition), and concurrently, exchanges made by actors participating in these markets are 
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best understood through processes of cost-benefit decision-making (Caulkins, Gurga, & 
Little, 2009; MacCoun & Reuter, 1992; Ritter, 2006). Although such models have been the 
principal analytical framework for understanding drug-focussed exchanges in offline markets, 
there is generally weak evidence for the applicability of these perspectives with respect to 
actual exchanges that are performed throughout these markets. The criticisms of rational drug 
exchanges outlined below draw attention to the incorrect assumptions that actors involved in 
drug-focussed exchanges are doing so purely out of self-interest in attempts to maximise their 
own benefit, and are operating within the ideal market structures proposed in neoclassical 
economics. Offline drug markets are highly imperfect markets in this regard and rational 
choice frameworks of exchange only partially contribute to understanding the exchanges that 
actually occur within these markets.  
 
Non-Ideal Market Structures 
Many researchers have pointed to the fact that offline illicit drug markets are not overly 
reflective of ideal markets inhabited by rational actors as normatively proposed. Particularly 
relevant here is the suggestion that illicit drug markets contain many economic irregularities 
(Caulkins & Reuter, 2006) pertaining to market structures when compared to neoclassical 
economic models of markets. For example, although price elasticity is predicted in ideal 
markets in accordance with supply/demand, illicit drug prices commonly remain relatively 
stable (or have even declined) over time, despite shortages, law enforcement activity and 
increased demand (Best, Strang, Beswick, & Gossop, 2001; Grossman, 2005). More 
specifically, the risks and prices framework, which proposes that law enforcement is an 
added tax that is built in to drug exchanges (Reuter & Kleiman, 1986), has proven to be 
incomplete in explaining prices due to complications in obtaining accurate price data (see 
Jacques & Wright, 2008; Ritter, 2006) and evidence over time showing that tougher law 
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enforcement does not necessarily increase drug prices in street-based markets (Pollack & 
Reuter, 2014). This suggests that there is a level of price inelasticity that may therefore be 
related to factors such as cultural expectation and structural circumstance (Dwyer & Moore, 
2010a; Moeller & Sandberg, 2019), beyond the control of market mechanisms of supply and 
demand, competition amongst sellers, the quality of drugs, or the risks/prices model of illicit 
drug sales. 
  
Are Drug Market Actors Utility-Maximisers?  
Social Supply and Other Forms of Altruistic Behaviour 
Whilst some forms of profit-oriented drug market exchanges do appear to conform to aspects 
of the rational choice model, there are common forms that do not. One such form is the social 
supply of recreational drugs, which Coomber and Turnbull (2007) explain make up the bulk 
of most drug exchanges, whilst at the same time rarely “touching” the drug market proper. 
The social supply of drugs predominantly occurs through the sharing and gifting of 
substances, or through exchanges made to friends and/or acquaintances that are characterised 
by the lack of motivation to make financial profit in the exchange (Coomber & Moyle, 2014; 
Coomber et al., 2018). The social supply of drugs (and the adjunct concept of minimally 
commercial supply) is a conceptual framework for understanding a particular form of drug 
supply that is at odds with rational choice perspectives of exchange, which propose that drug 
sellers are inherently profit-motivated individuals. In fact, social suppliers often distance 
themselves from believing they are someone who makes commercially-oriented sales. The 
primary purpose of the exchange is for cultivating friendships, which is reflected through 
practices (e.g. offering discounts and the provision of free drugs) (Coomber & Turnbull, 
2007; Crawford, 2016), and through the personal belief in not being “in the business to make 
money” (Moeller & Sandberg, 2019, p. 304). Although benefits to social capital can be 
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derived from these exchanges (Moyle & Coomber, 2019), this is often not a dimension of 
utility that actors are expecting to maximise or increase because of the exchange. Even for 
drug sellers at different levels of illicit drug markets, who would not consider themselves to 
be social suppliers, raising prices of illicit drugs in order to maximise financial profits of the 
exchange may be incompatible with expectations that a “fair price” is maintained (Dwyer & 
Moore, 2010a; Moeller & Sandberg, 2019).   
 Rational choice perspectives have also traditionally struggled to account for how 
altruistic behaviour engenders action over purely self-interested principles (Becker, 1976; 
Khalil, 2004). Mostly, in the context of illicit drug markets, this refers to the sharing of illicit 
substances between individuals. Sellers of illicit drugs may also forego profits for ideological 
reasons (Blum, 1972), for example, to assist those experiencing substance withdrawal (Dwyer 
& Moore, 2010a; Jacobs, 1996) or to facilitate their own use of drugs (Jacobs, 1999). This 
behaviour is highly reflective of the anthropological research previously discussed on gift-
giving, relationship-building, and acts of altruism as opposed to rational-actor frameworks of 
market exchange (Coomber, Moyle, & South, 2016; Jacques & Wright, 2008).  
 
Drug-Related Harms and Structural Disadvantages 
The nature of drug-related harms and the wider structural disadvantages that affect 
individuals in certain illicit drug markets reduce the degree to which rational choice models 
can be relied on as the primary explanation of the nature of exchange. Assumptions of utility-
maximisation in illicit drug markets stands in contrast to the reality of individuals who 
experience drug-related harms. Instead, when such actors are involved, these exchanges are 
mostly performed due to the actors’ physiological/psychological dependency on a particular 
substance. Though substance dependence itself has been considered through a rational choice 
lens (Becker & Murphy, 1988), and there may be tangential benefits relayed to the buyer in 
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these specific situations, obtaining and maximising these benefits is not the primary essence 
of the exchange. In a similar vein, preferences on prices, and on the quality of the substance 
being exchanged, may not taken be taken into account as people who use drugs may, through 
physical/psychological urgency, be more or less compelled to accept whatever offer is on the 
table (Jacques et al., 2014). Finally, a preference to self fund one’s own supply through 
selling (as opposed to other criminal alternatives such as shoplifting, burglary, robbery or 
prostitution), in conjunction with wider societal or economic disadvantages, may be the 
primary reasons to begin selling drugs rather than for entirely profit-motivated reasons 
(Dunlap, Johnson, Kotarba, & Fackler, 2010; Moyle & Coomber, 2017; Werb, Kerr, Li, 
Montaner, & Wood, 2008).   
 
A Lack of Information in Illlicit Drug Markets to Guide Effective Decision-Making 
Archetypal models of markets suggest that exchanges occur within settings where buyers are 
able to gather information and compare options amongst competitive sellers to enable a 
rational decision. The ability to use information to guide rational decision-making is rarely 
reflected in offline illicit drug markets for two reasons. Firstly, the illegal nature of the 
exchange itself restricts the ability for information on products, or sellers, to be made widely 
available to exchange participants (Beckert & Wehinger, 2013). Secondly, offline drug 
markets are usually highly fragmented or may be populated by transient actors (Denton & 
O'Malley, 1999; Hoffer, 2016), and thus do not share the characteristics or structures of ideal 
markets that facilitate drug market actors to compare options within a competitive market 
(Dwyer & Moore, 2010a). This lack of information in illicit drug markets creates higher 
levels of unknowns, and therefore greater risks are embedded within illicit drug market 
exchanges. Buyers cite risks involved in the exchange such as the quality of substances, the 
reliability of the seller of these substances, and the likelihood of detection from law 
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enforcement (Eck, 1995; Jacques et al., 2014; Reuter & Caulkins, 2004). Although, taking the 
quality of substances as an example, drug buyers may rely on basic sensory tests, and 
suggestions of quality from dealers and members of their peer group, these methods are less 
reliable, and are inaccurate in measuring the quality of drugs or detecting the inclusion of 
adulterants even for experienced users (Coomber et al., 2014; Evrard, Legleye, & Cadet-
Taïrou, 2010). Illicit drug market actors are not afforded, to any considerable degree, 
information to inform to support ‘rational’ decisions as a result of competitive market 
structures. For this reason, it has been suggested that many street-based drug sellers will 
satisfice rather than maximise (May & Hough, 2004). 
 
The Importance of “Trust” in Illicit Drug Exchanges 
Exchanges performed within contexts of scarce information have a greater level of risk 
involved for actors. Trust, a concept generally characterised by principles of co-operation and 
shared norms of behaviour (Rousseau, Sitkin, Burt, & Camerer, 1998), is typically relied on 
in such instances to navigate uncertainties involved in the exchange process and to substitute 
for knowledge. However, exchange norms in the context of illicit drug sales may be 
“unspecified, poorly communicated, uncertain in practice, and may change at any moment” 
(Hoffer, 2016, p.182). Because of the illicit nature of drug exchanges, there is an inherent 
wariness from sellers of being exposed to law enforcement, or being robbed by buyers or 
other sellers, and parallel fears from the buyers’ perspective on being ‘ripped-off’, subject to 
violence or intimidation, or being exposed to undercover law enforcement (Eck, 1995; 
Jacobs, 1998, 2000; Jacques et al., 2014; Strub & Priest, 1976).  
Rational choice models of exchange assume anonymity between buyers and sellers. 
However, in the context of drug-focussed exchanges, selling to, or buying from, unknown 
persons potentially exposes both parties to increased levels of risk. Because of the lack of 
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information or security, the degree of trust between a buyer and seller is critical in 
overcoming some of the risks present due to the lack of information to guide purely rational 
exchanges (Chalmers & Bradford, 2013; Dwyer & Moore, 2010b; Jacobs, 1998; Wedow, 
1979). Many drug-focussed exchanges are endowed with rich social contexts, and the social 
relations that emerge from these exchanges cannot be accounted for through pure rational 
choice models of drug market behaviour (Dwyer & Moore, 2010b; Moeller, 2018). 
Specifically, models of rationality and neoclassical economics neglect such factors through 
assumptions of anonymity.  
 
The Affordance of Rationality in Online Illicit Drug Market Exchanges 
The Internet has transformed shopping practices for legal products (Doherty & Ellis-
Chadwick, 2010), and similarly, illicit drug markets are now thriving in various channels 
across the surface net and dark net, and on apps installed on smartphones. In legal online 
markets, due to the vastly different nature of online retailing in comparison to physical 
shopfront retailing, key elements of rationality have been introduced to understand these 
exchanges. For instance, legal online markets provide a cognitively-rich environment for 
buyers allowing utilitarian motivations for control, economic utility, information, and 
anonymity in exchanges to come to fruition (Childers, Carr, Peck, & Carson, 2001; Elder-
Vass, 2018; Martínez-López, Pla-García, Gázquez-Abad, & Rodríguez-Ardura, 2014). 
Furthermore, the features embedded within many online markets allows buyers to evaluate 
sellers, to collect information to inform a rational exchange, and to make multi-attributable 
comparisons that reduce the search costs associated with collecting this information in 
comparison to physical retail markets (Childers et al., 2001). The explanatory limits of 
rational choice models of exchange in relation to various offline illicit drug markets discussed 
thus far within this paper suggests a generally weak applicability of such approaches for 
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understanding offline drug market exchanges. Our analysis of the nature of exchanges in 
online drug markets henceforth considers how the exchange assemblage is reconstructed in 
digital environments. Online drug exchanges are performed in an entirely different structural, 
and thus relational, context and this has implications for how we theorise the nature of the 
exchange.  
Specifically, the concept of affordance is used here to describe how online drug 
markets afford elements of rationality in the drug exchange process. Gibson’s (1977) early 
definition of affordances relayed the complementarity of animals and environments, and 
specifically, that affordances are the action possibilities that exist within particular 
environments. Later reconceptualisations of this notion, such as Latour’s (2002), focussed on 
removing the overly constructivist or deterministic lenses when referring to technology and 
humans. The relationship between human and non-human objects is one of affordance, 
whereby the confluence of objects and actors work together. Technologies do not determine 
activity, but they can afford different intentions, practices, decisions and goals (Bloomfield, 
Latham, & Vurdubakis, 2010; Faraj & Azad, 2012; Fraser, Treloar, Gendera, & Rance, 2017; 
Hutchby, 2001; Latour, 2002). We explore the affordance capabilities of online drug markets 
with particular reference to elements of rationality, noting how online drug markets have the 
capacity to afford new meanings and actions in drug exchange.  
 
Surface Net, Dark Net, and Social Media Drug Markets 
Illicit drug markets on the surface net (referred to elsewhere as the “clear” net) are directly 
accessible via conventional search engines (i.e. Google, Bing, and Yahoo). Surface net drug 
supply is mostly focused on the supply of new psychoactive substances (NPS) and 
counterfeit/prescription-required pharmaceuticals (particularly “lifestyle” drugs and 
performance and image-enhancing drugs) (Lavorgna, 2015; Walsh, 2011). The surface net 
18 
	
provides for the distribution of these substances through web-stores that have their servers 
located in countries where it may be entirely legal to manufacture, possess and distribute 
these substances, and where products may also be marketed disingenuously (for example, as 
“bath salts” or “plant food”) in order to evade authority (Walsh, 2011).  
By comparison, the deep web is the part of the Internet that is inaccessible (e.g. 
intranets or otherwise “protected” cyberspace) to casual browsing and searching, and is 
estimated to hold a much larger portion of information than is accessible through the surface 
net. It is in the deep web where the so-called “dark” net is to be found where a variety of 
illegal activity takes place (Chertoff, 2017). The dark net is populated by websites or fora 
where illegal activities can be conducted, such as exchanging illegal information, discussing 
illegal activities or purchasing illegal products. In the current context, illicit drugs are 
typically sold through “cryptomarkets” (Martin, 2014a) that resemble larger e-commerce 
legal online markets such as eBay and Amazon (Barratt & Aldridge, 2016). Because of the 
anonymous and encrypted nature of drug cryptomarkets, drug sales are not restricted to 
products where there remains some ambiguity on the legality of the product, as is the case in 
surface net markets. Drugs commonly sold on cryptomarkets vary, from those taken by 
recreational drug users (e.g. cannabis/cannabis-related products, MDMA and other stimulant-
type substances, LSD, and a range of “legal” and illegal NPS) (Barratt, Ferris, & Winstock, 
2014; Van Buskirk, Naicker, Roxburgh, Bruno, & Burns, 2016) through to opiates and crack 
cocaine (Gilbert & Dasgupta, 2017). Many cryptomarkets contain features such as escrow 
payment systems, where a third-party (i.e. the administrators of the cryptomarket) hold the 
funds from any sales until the transaction has been “finalised” by a buyer and they are 
satisfied with their delivery (Barratt & Aldridge, 2016). This ensures that exchanges 
organised through cryptomarkets are conducted appropriately and held to standards.  
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Lastly, and somewhere between surface net and deep web cryptomarkets, the 
utilisation of social media and encrypted messaging applications has recently been 
acknowledged as another mechanism of drug supply through online technologies. Apps are 
used in diverse ways to organise drug exchanges between buyers and sellers (Demant, 
Bakken, Oksanen, & Gunnlaugsson, 2019; Moyle, Childs, Coomber, & Barratt, 2019), 
including as large-scale commercial marketplaces, but also as a preferred communication tool 
between sellers and their customers (Bakken & Demant, 2019; Demant et al., 2019; Moyle et 
al., 2019). App-based drug exchanges, unlike other forms of online drug supply, still involve 
a physical meeting for the exchange of drugs, but the structural features and reliance on 
technology clearly differentiates this supply from the remit of pure offline drug exchanges.  
 
Information-Rich Arenas of Drug Exchange 
The resemblance of cryptomarkets and surface net drug markets to large e-commerce 
websites affords access to information not available in many offline drug exchanges. This is 
similar to other online retailing sites where information regarding retailer reliability is 
comprehensive and available to buyers (Bolton & Ockenfels, 2009). Drug buyers in various 
online drug markets are able to absorb drug-related information such as the advertised price, 
quality, and type of substances sold, as well as information on the perceived reliability of the 
seller through feedback systems (Barratt & Aldridge, 2016; Martin, 2014b; van de Ven & 
Koenraadt, 2017). Cryptomarkets, in particular, are heralded as solving some of the 
coordination problems that typically constrain informed choices in offline street-based 
markets, thus making cryptomarkets more structurally efficient than conventional illicit drug 
markets (Bakken et al., 2018), and providing drug market participants with an “abundance of 
drug market intelligence” (Aldridge & Askew, 2017, p. 108). Even in app-based drug 
markets, which feature less information available to buyers to guide them in their exchange, 
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buyers still utilise signals (i.e. reviews from other buyers, photos/videos of products) to assess 
the reliability of sellers and the perceived quality of the products they are offering (Demant et 
al., 2019; Moyle et al., 2019). Online illicit drug markets are arenas of exchange that are 
comparatively rich in information. In turn, this reduces, or at least mitigates, many of the 
risks traditionally associated within illicit drug exchanges. By adopting the notion of 
affordance we can note how online illicit drug markets can afford actors the capacity to make 
an exchange with a considerable amount of information at their disposal, to guide the 
exchange process and inform rational action. 
  
Affording Utility in the Drug Exchange  
The structures of online drug markets themselves somewhat force buyers to make an active 
decision on the substance they want to purchase, as well as from which seller they are 
wanting to purchase. Whereas conventional offline illicit drug market decisions are bound by 
many factors as discussed above (i.e. social expectations, structural circumstances, and 
access), online exchanges (particularly at the dark net and surface net level), may be less 
explained by opportunistic or convenience assumptions for drug acquisition, but instead, 
actors are afforded an exchange that can be the result of expressing purposeful decisions and 
preferences. This process of decision-making is a direct affordance of the structural capacity 
of online illicit drug markets that afford utility-maximising decisions in the drug exchange 
process to a degree not possible in offline illicit drug markets. Indeed, cryptomarket buyers 
themselves frequently mention having more control and agency over their drug buying 
activity (Bancroft & Reid, 2015), a theme that is also applicable to other online drug buyers. 
Cryptomarket buyers (Barratt et al., 2014; Hout & Bingham, 2013b; Van Buskirk et al., 
2016) and surface net drug buyers of lifestyle drugs (Koenraadt & Ven, 2018; Kraska, 
Bussard, & Brent, 2010) are drawn to these platforms to keep the financial costs of their drug 
21 
	
exchanges low. Likewise, online drug vendors across all online domains are able to employ 
tactics that increase future sales and maximise the financial profits from the exchange process 
(e.g. charging “premiums” for taking on extra risks) (Cunliffe, Martin, Décary-Hétu, & 
Aldridge, 2017; Ladegaard, 2018; Moyle et al., 2019; van de Ven & Koenraadt, 2017). These 
opportunities are less afforded by offline exchange assemblages. 
 Online drug buyers may seek to maximise their expected utility in exchange through a 
wide range of ways not available in conventional offline illicit drug markets. For example, 
although buyers in app-based drug markets do not tend to mention the reduction of financial 
costs through utilisation of the platform, preferences are expressed through the convenience 
and speed of obtaining illicit drugs due to the speedy local access that app-based drug 
markets facilitate (Moyle et al., 2019). Additionally, cryptomarkets are used to maximise 
broader perspectives of utility, such as the need to remain undetected from law enforcement, 
and the quality of drugs that the buyers is seeking through an exchange (Barratt et al., 2014; 
Hout & Bingham, 2013a, 2013b). In this instance, although the quality may not apply directly 
to the forensic testing of the drugs (van der Gouwe, Brunt, van Laar, & van der Pol, 2017), 
buyers appear to be comforted in the assurances of quality that cryptomarkets provide 
through their feedback systems. Other marketplace features, such as the escrow payment 
system in cryptomarkets, provide drug buyers with enhanced assurances concerning the 
person they are exchanging with, as actors are effectively forced to abide by the norms of the 
exchange. In sum, these new exchange spaces for illicit drugs afford both buyers and sellers 
the opportunity to improve their decision-making in line with notions of rational choice, 
however it may be conceived with respect to illicit drug exchanges, in ways and to an extent 
not available in offline drug market structures.  
 
“Anonymous” Actors Operating in Online Markets  
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Whilst some offline illicit drug markets (e.g. open-air street markets, May & Hough, 2004) 
can retain features of anonymity between the actors involved in the drug exchange, most 
offline illicit drug market exchanges are performed in socially embedded contexts that cannot 
be accommodated by rational choice models (Dwyer & Moore, 2010a; Moeller, 2018; 
Moeller & Sandberg, 2019; Sandberg, 2012). Anonymity, and in-built mechanisms to ensure 
it, is a key feature of digital spaces for buying and selling drugs. Some online drug markets 
reflect this to a considerable degree, such as cryptomarkets, that rely on the use of 
anonymising browsers and encrypted currencies, and though surface net and app-based 
markets may demonstrate this to a lesser degree, there may still be the utilisation of encrypted 
communication platforms and pseudonyms/usernames that serve to reinforce aspects of 
anonymity within the exchange (Barratt & Aldridge, 2016; Moyle et al., 2019; Phelps & 
Watt, 2014). Due partly to the increased information on offer to actors involved in 
cryptomarkets (and to a lesser extent on surface net markets and app-based markets), there is 
less traditional risk involved in the exchange. Thus, there is less need for exchanges to be 
performed with a backdrop of long-lasting relationships or prior communication between 
actors.  
 
Conclusion  
There has been a distinct lack of theoretical attention in research on burgeoning online illicit 
drug markets. We sought to address this lacuna and extend on earlier efforts to conceptualise 
the theoretical nature of drug exchanges in these new spaces for buying and selling illicit 
drugs (Aldridge & Askew, 2017; Bakken et al., 2018; Masson & Bancroft, 2018). In offline 
drug exchanges, although underlying notions of neoclassical theory and homo economicus are 
persistently discredited, rational choice perspectives of exchange still tend to dominate 
explanations of the drug exchange process. By comprehending drug exchanges as complex 
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assemblages (DeLanda, 2006; Duff, 2016), and considering the affordance capabilities of 
technologies (Latour, 2002), we have explored how the nature of drug exchange is being 
reconstructed in different market spheres (offline/online). Key aspects of rationality can 
potentially contribute to understanding exchange practices in these new markets, where the 
nature of, and structures facilitating, the exchange have been significantly altered. In this 
view, rationality is not a foundational essence of the actors involved in the exchange but a 
capacity that emerges in particular structural contexts. This theoretical exploration was 
undertaken with a particular focus on the common critiques of rational choice perspectives in 
offline drug markets and by reflecting on how some aspects of rationality, such as greater 
subjectivity, higher degrees of anonymity, and the considerable information available to 
actors in cost/benefit decision-making, are afforded individuals in online environments.  
Drug exchange assemblages are reconstructed across different market spheres. 
Conceptually mapping the differences between illicit drug markets is also fundamental in 
forming a view of them as differentiated in meaningful ways (e.g. acknowledging variation in 
supply patterns and the practices of individuals within the market), which is often neglected 
in drug market research (Coomber, 2010, 2015). Furthermore, examining the structural 
reconfigurations of drug exchanges in different environments sheds light on the need for 
theoretical frameworks related to drug market behaviour to be sensitive to the unique 
exchange assemblages of that market. In a related sense, our article has explored structural 
differentiation, with reference to the affordance of rationality in the exchange, within 
different online drug markets. Cryptomarkets, by virtue of their structural resemblance to 
large centralised markets, may best afford aspects of rationality in understanding the 
exchange process due to the increased security offered by the platform, and the enhanced 
ability for buyers and sellers to maximise (or satisfice) utility relative to other illicit drug 
markets. In other online spaces (i.e. surface net and app-based), however, the affordance 
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capabilities of the technology to promote rationalised forms of exchange are less evident. For 
example, although cryptomarket exchanges may generally require a degree of planning and 
preparation, exchange arrangements in app-based drug markets can be the result of more 
spontaneous decision-making. This is particularly so as the drugs can be accessed at a faster 
rate in app-based markets due to their greater local reach, and because exchanges may be 
performed due to other extenuating factors (e.g. alcohol intoxication) (Moyle et al., 2019). As 
illicit drug markets continue to diversify through the use of online technology, monitoring 
and analysing the changing nature of drug exchanges is important. 
 The reality of market exchanges, as has been shown historically, is much more 
complicated and nuanced than predicted by a priori assumptions. The divisions found in 
conceptualisations of exchange in drug markets is somewhat a reflection of the levels of 
analysis employed, whereby economic explanations typically focus on market-level analyses, 
and criminological research on street-level markets often attempts to apply findings from 
localised contexts to this broader figurative market (Moeller, 2018). As argued by Dwyer and 
Moore (2010b, p.88), drug market research underpinned by neoclassical assumptions “can 
describe market-like characteristics, but [it] cannot explain markets or account for people’s 
actions within them”. Future research on drug-focussed exchanges in online illicit drug 
markets will potentially benefit methodologically by the different levels of analysis that can 
be undertaken on the exchange milieu in some digital platforms, which simultaneously allow 
for a blend of approaches to both market-level characteristics as well as individual action 
within these markets, thus reducing many of the theoretical and empirical conflicts often 
found between economics and criminology. Therefore, more research is needed to develop an 
understanding of how actors interact with the structures provided by online drug markets for 
buying and selling, the extent to which rational choice frameworks can contribute to an 
analysis of this behaviour, and how (notwithstanding the fallacy of homo economicus) 
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information-rich structures enable greater control over exchange decisions. Online forms of 
illicit drug markets have the potential to reconstruct the capabilities and meanings of the 
exchange process, but whether or not this plays out in practice is work for future research.  
Arguably, the utilisation of theoretical frameworks to better understand buyer 
behaviour yields a deeper (albeit abstracted) understanding of the behaviour that occurs 
within illicit drug markets. Our article described how analyses of the exchange process in 
illicit drug markets need to occur within an expanded understanding of the structural features 
and nuances of what have clearly emerged as differentiated market spheres. The market that 
individuals interact with is a key component of the complex assemblage that constitutes a 
drug exchange. Exchange assemblages are reconstructed in digital environments, and online 
platforms may afford greater elements of rationality to be introduced in the exchange process 
than offline forms of drug exchange.  
 
Notes 
1	We acknowledge the diverse forms of drug exchange that exist in offline contexts (e.g. 
open/closed street markets, social supply networks, etc.). For ease of expression throughout 
the paper, these various forms will be referred to as offline illicit drug markets, except where 
particular forms of offline drug markets are specified. 
2	There is growing literature discussing the non-binary conceptualisation of the online/offline 
divide in relation to crime (Powell, Stratton, & Cameron, 2018), but we use the terms ‘online’ 
and ‘offline’ drug markets as placeholder terms (see Martin, Munksgaard, Coomber, Demant, 
& Barratt, 2019). 
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